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Between 1940 and 2000 there has been a substantial increase of educational attainment in
the United States. What caused this trend? We develop a model of schooling decisions
in order to assess the quantitative contribution of technological progress in explaining the
evolution of education. We use earnings across educational groups and growth in gross
domestic product per worker to restrict technological progress. These restrictions imply
substantial skill-biased technical change (SBTC). We ﬁnd that changes in relative earnings
through SBTC can explain the bulk of the increase in educational attainment. In particular,
a calibrated version of the model generates an increase in average years of schooling of 48
percent compared to 27 percent in the data. This strong eﬀect of changes in relative earnings
on educational attainment is robust to relevant variations in the model and is consistent
with empirical estimates of the long-run income elasticity of schooling. We also ﬁnd that
the substantial increase in life expectancy observed during the period contributes little to
the change in educational attainment in the model.
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11 Introduction
One remarkable feature of the twentieth century in the United States is the substantial
increase in educational attainment of the population. Figure 1 illustrates this point. In
1940, about 8 percent of white males aged 25 to 29 had completed a college education,
31 percent had a high school degree but did not ﬁnish college, and 61 percent did not
even complete high school.1 The picture is remarkably diﬀerent in 2000 when 28 percent
completed college, 58 percent completed high school, and 13 percent did not complete high
school. Although our focus is on white males, Figure 2 shows that the trends of Figure 1 are
broadly shared across genders and races. The question we address in this paper is: What
caused this substantial and systematic rise in educational attainment in the United States?
Understanding the evolution of educational attainment is relevant given the importance of
human capital on the growth experience of the United States as well as nearly all other
developed and developing countries.
We develop a model of human capital accumulation to assess the quantitative importance
of observed changes in relative earnings across educational groups in generating trends in
educational attainment. Our ﬁnding is that changes in relative earnings can explain the
bulk of the increase in educational attainment in the United States between 1940 and 2000.
Our focus on relative earnings is motivated by data. Using the IPUMS samples for the
1940 to 2000 U.S. Census, we compute weekly earnings across three educational groups for
white males of a given age cohort: less than high school, high school, and college.2 Relative
earnings among educational groups exhibit noticeable changes since 1940 as documented in
Figure 3. For instance, earnings of college relative to high school increased by 22 percent
(from 1.58 in 1940 to 1.94 in 2000), while the relative earnings of high school to less than
high school increased by 30 percent (from 1.47 in 1940 to 1.92 in 2000).3
We argue that a change in relative earnings of 20 to 30 percent can generate a substantial
increase in educational attainment. To illustrate this point, consider an elasticity of college
attainment with respect to relative lifetime income of 8 as suggested by some empirical micro
evidence. Then, a 20 percent increase in the earnings of college relative to high school can
1In what follows we refer to the detailed educational categories simply as less than high school, high
school, and college. See the appendix for details of data sources and deﬁnitions.
2Weekly earnings refers to pre-tax wage and salary income divided by the number of weeks worked. In
what follows, we refer to weekly earnings, earnings, and income interchangeably.
3Figure 3 illustrates patterns that have been emphasized in the wage-structure literature. Both the returns
to college and high school exhibit increasing trends. The return to college decreased during the 1940s and
1970s and rose sharply during the 1980s and 1990s. Acemoglu (2002), for example, reports a similar pattern
for the returns to college. The compression observed in the 1940s was documented and discussed by Goldin
and Margo (1992).
2increase college attainment by a factor of 4.3, which compares to 3.7 in the data. This
calculation suggests that observed changes in relative earnings are quantitatively important
in explaining the rise in educational attainment between 1940 and 2000. However, relative
earnings and the implied elasticity of educational attainment are endogenous to education
decisions. As a result, a quantitative model is needed in order to discipline and disentangle
the relevant forces and to provide a quantitative assessment. The model would also need to
be able to capture the changes in returns to schooling across educational categories.
We consider a model of human capital accumulation that features discrete schooling
choices, heterogeneity in schooling utility, a standard human capital production function
that requires the inputs of time and goods as in Ben-Porath (1967), and exogenous driving
forces that take the form of neutral and skill-biased productivity parameters in the produc-
tion function. Discrete schooling choice is relevant because the distribution of people across
years of schooling in the data is concentrated around completion years. Also, the discrete
choice allows the model to match distribution statistics such as those presented in Figure
1 as opposed to just averages for a representative agent. The assumption that agents are
heterogeneous in the marginal utility from schooling time is common in both the macro
literature (e.g. Bils and Klenow (2000)) as well as the empirical labor literature (e.g., Heck-
man, Lochner, and Taber (1998)).4 Moreover, given the discreteness of schooling levels, the
model with heterogeneity implies that changes in exogenous factors have smooth eﬀects on
aggregate variables such as educational attainment and income.
We implement a quantitative experiment to assess the importance of changes in relative
earnings on the rise of educational attainment. We discipline the exogenous variables in the
model, i.e., the pace of technical change, by using data on relative earnings among workers of
diﬀerent schooling groups. More generally, the parameters of the model are chosen to match
a set of key statistics, including educational attainment in 2000, earnings diﬀerentials across
schooling levels from 1940 to 2000, and the average growth rate of gross domestic product
(GDP) per worker between 1940 and 2000. This quantitative strategy follows the approach
advocated by Kydland and Prescott (1996). In particular, we emphasize that the parameter
values are not chosen to ﬁt the data on educational attainment from 1940 to 2000, instead
they are chosen to mimic the trends in relative earnings. The answer to the quantitative
importance of changes in relative earnings over time is measured by the capacity of the model
to generate substantial trends in educational attainment as observed in the data.
The main ﬁndings are as follows. Results from the baseline model show that changes
4An additional source of heterogeneity may be through “learning ability.” Navarro (2007) ﬁnds, however,
that individual heterogeneity aﬀects college attendance mostly through the preference channel.
3in relative earnings across schooling groups generate a substantial increase in educational
attainment that is consistent with the trends in each educational category. As a summary
statistic, the model generates a 48 percent increase in average years of schooling between 1940
and 2000 compared to the 27 percent increase in the U.S. data. The bulk of this increase in
the model is generated by the change in high-school to less-than-high-school relative earnings
and relatively less by the change in college to high-school relative earnings. The quantitative
contribution of relative earnings to educational attainment depends on the assumption about
their change after the year 2000. Assuming no further change in relative earnings after 2000,
the model is closer to replicating the change in educational attainment in the time series
data – a 39 percent increase in educational attainment versus 48 in the baseline calibration.
We show that these results are robust to relevant variations in the model. First, although
life expectancy has increased substantially during the period of analysis, we ﬁnd that this
change generates a small increase in educational attainment in the model. Returns to human
capital are higher early in the life cycle rather than later so changes in life expectancy accrue
low returns for schooling investment. Second, we extend the model to allow for on-the-job
human capital accumulation and ﬁnd little diﬀerence with our baseline results. This is due
to the systematic fall in the returns to experience for recent cohorts in the United States
– see for instance Manovskii and Kambourov (2005). Third, the increase in educational
attainment is the same as in the baseline model when we extend it to allow for TFP-level
eﬀects. In this case, changes in relative earnings generate about 90 percent of the increase
in educational attainment in the model as opposed to 100 percent in the baseline.
Our model builds on the human capital literature, most notably Becker (1975), Ben-
Porath (1967), Mincer (1974), and Heckman (1975). It is also close to Heckman, Lochner,
and Taber (1998). However, Heckman, Lochner, and Taber (1998) focus on explaining the
increase in U.S. wage inequality in the recent past (see also Topel (1997)). Our emphasis
is on understanding the rise in educational attainment conditional on matching changes in
the returns to schooling. Our work is close to a literature in macroeconomics assessing
the role of technical progress on a variety of trends such as women’s labor supply (e.g.,
Greenwood, Seshadri, and Yorukoglu (2005)), fertility and the baby boom (e.g., Greenwood,
Seshadri, and Vandenbroucke (2005)), the structural transformation across countries and
regions (e.g., Gollin, Parente, and Rogerson (2002) and Caselli and Coleman (2001)), the
transition from stagnation to modern economic growth (e.g., Hansen and Prescott (2002)),
among others.5 Our paper is also related to the labor literature emphasizing the connection
between technology and education – for instance Goldin and Katz (2007) – and the literature
on wage inequality emphasizing skill-biased technical change – see for instance Juhn, Murphy,
5See Greenwood and Seshadri (2005) for an excellent survey of this broad literature.
4and Pierce (1993) and Katz and Author (1999). We recognize that technological progress
may not be the only explanation for rising education – for instance Glomm and Ravikumar
(2001) emphasize the rise in public-sector provision of education – and that educational
attainment has been rising well before 1940. Our focus on the period between 1940 and
2000 follows from data restrictions and the emphasis in the labor literature on technological
progress as the likely cause of rising wage inequality. In the broader historical context, other
complementary explanations may be needed – see Kaboski (2004) on the decline of direct
schooling costs.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section we describe the model. In Section
3 we conduct the main quantitative experiments. Section 4 extends the model to allow for
changes in life expectancy, returns to experience, and TFP-level eﬀects. In Section 5 we
discuss our results by performing a series of sensitivity analysis and by placing the results
in the context of the related literature. We conclude in Section 6.
2M o d e l
In this section we develop a model of schooling decisions in order to assess the quantitative
contribution of technological progress to the rise of educational attainment in the United
States.
2.1 Environment
The economy is populated by overlapping-generations of constant size normalized to one.
Time is discrete and indexed by t =0 ,1,...,∞.A g e n t sa r ea l i v ef o rT p e r i o d sa n da r ee x -
ante heterogeneous. Speciﬁcally, they are indexed by a ∈ R, which represents the intensity
of their (dis)taste for schooling time, and is distributed according to the time-invariant
cumulative distribution function A. We assume that the utility cost is observed before any
schooling and consumption decisions are made. We also assume that there is no uncertainty
in the model.
An individual’s human capital is denoted by h(s,e)w h e r es represents the number of
periods spent in school and e represents expenses aﬀecting the quality of schooling. Both
s and e are choice variables. There are three levels of schooling labeled 1, 2 and 3. To
complete level i an agent must spend si ∈{ s1,s 2,s 3} periods in school and, therefore, is not
able to work before reaching age si + 1. The restriction 0 <s 1 <s 2 <s 3 <Tis imposed so
that level 1 is the model’s counterpart to the less-than-high-school level discussed previously.
5Similarly, level 2 corresponds to high-school and level 3 to college. Aggregate human capital
results from the proper aggregation of individual’s human capital across generations and
educational attainment. It is the only input into the production of the consumption good.
The wage rate per unit of human capital is denoted by w(s) for an agent with s years of
schooling. This is to allow for the possibility that technological progress aﬀects the relative
returns across schooling groups. Credit markets are perfect and r denotes the gross rate of
interest.
2.2 Technology
At each date, there is one good produced with a constant-returns-to-scale technology. This
technology is linear in the aggregate human capital input,
Yt = ztHt,
where zt is total factor productivity. The stock of aggregate human capital, Ht, is also linear
Ht = z1tH1t + z2tH2t + z3tH3t, (1)
where Hit is the stock of human capital supplied by agents with schooling si,a n dzit is a
skill-speciﬁc productivity parameter. These linearity assumptions are not essential for the
main quantitative results of the paper but simplify the exposition and computation of the
model. We illustrate the implications of diﬀerent elasticities of substitution across schooling
groups in Section 5.
The technical parameters zt and zit are the only exogenous variables in the economy.
Since our focus is on long-run trends, we assume constant growth rates:
zt+1 = gzt ∀t
zi,t+1 = gizit, for i =1 ,2,3; ∀t.
Equation (1) implies that the following normalization is innocuous: z1t =1f o ra l lt,t h u s
g1 = 1. Regarding the level of zt, we set it to one at an arbitrary date. As it will transpire
shortly, this normalization is innocuous too. The determination of the levels of z2t and z3t
is discussed in Section 3.
We consider a market arrangement where there is a large number of competitive ﬁrms in
both product and factor markets that have access to the production technology. Taking the
6output good as the numeraire, the wage rate per unit of human capital is given by
wt(si)=ztzi.
The youngest worker of type i at date t is of age si +1a n dt h u s ,w a s“ b o r n ”i np e r i o d
t − si, i.e. of age 1 at date t − si. The oldest worker is T-period old and was born in period





where piτ is the fraction of cohort τ that has attained the ith level of education, and eτ(si)i s
the optimal schooling quality of this cohort. The discussions of eτ(si)a n dpiτ are postponed
to Sections 2.3 and 2.4.
2.3 Households
Preferences are deﬁned over consumption sequences and time spent in school. They are




t−τ ln(cτ,t) − as,
where β ∈ (0,1) is the subjective discount factor, cτ,t is the period-t consumption of an agent
of generation τ and, ﬁnally, s ∈{ s1,s 2,s 3} represents years of schooling. Note that a can
be positive or negative, so that schooling provides either a utility beneﬁt or a cost. The







where Φ is the cumulative distribution function of the standard normal distribution. The
normality assumption on the utility cost of schooling is not essential for the results. In Section
5, we show that the shape of this distribution function is pinned down by the calibration
so allowing for a more general distribution function with the same number of parameters





7The optimization problem of a cohort-τ individual with ability a, conditional on going to
school for s periods, is


























where the maximization is with respect to sequences of consumption and the quality of
education eτ. The budget constraint equates the date-τ value of consumption to the date-τ
value of labor earnings, h(s,eτ)Wτ(s), net of investment in quality, eτ. The function Wτ(s)
indicates the date-τ value of labor earnings per unit of human capital. Observe that the time
cost of schooling is summarized in Wτ(s). Hence, the model features a time cost of schooling
(foregone wages), a resource cost eτ, and a utility cost a. Observe also that human capital
is constant throughout the life cycle. In Section 4, we discuss the quantitative implications
of extending the model to allow for human capital accumulation on the job. We also discuss
the implications of allowing for the increase in life expectancy observed in the data.




This problem can be solved in three steps. First, given s, it simpliﬁes to a utility maxi-
mization problem which can, in itself, be divided into two parts. Speciﬁcally, the optimal
investment in the quality of education, that is eτ, maximizes net lifetime earnings. Then,
given net lifetime earnings, the agent optimally allocates consumption through time using
the credit markets. Hence, conditional on s, the optimal investment in quality, for an agent







8The optimal amount of human capital is
h(s,eτ(s)) = s[Wτ(s)(1 − η)]
(1−η)/η. (3)
For later reference, we deﬁne the period t labor income of an agent of cohort τ with education
si as Li,τ,t = h(si,e τ(si))wt(si)f o rt ≥ τ +si. The net lifetime income of an agent of cohort
τ is Iτ(s)=h(s,eτ(s))Wτ(s) − eτ(s)o r
Iτ(s)=κsWτ(s)
1/η, (4)
where κ =( 1 − η)(1−η)/η − (1 − η)1/η. The optimal allocation of consumption through
time, given Iτ(s), is dictated by the Euler equation, cτ,t+1 = βrcτ,t, and the lifetime budget
constraint. At this stage, it is convenient to deﬁne Vτ(s) ≡ ˜ Vτ(a,s)+as. In words, the
function Vτ(s) is the lifetime utility derived from consumption only, for an agent of cohort
τ with s periods of schooling. Note that Vτ(s) is not a function of a. The optimal schooling
choice described in (2) can then be written as
max
s∈{s1,s2,s3}
{Vτ(s) − as}. (5)
2.4 Equilibrium
An equilibrium is a sequence of prices {wt(si)} and an allocation of households across school-
ing levels such that, for all t, wt(si)=ztzit and households of any cohort τ solve problem
(2) given prices.
In equilibrium each cohort is partitioned between the three levels of schooling. The deter-
mination of this partition is described in Figures 4 and 5. Figure 4 describes an individual’s
optimal schooling choice by comparing the value functions Vτ(s)−as across the three levels
s1, s2 and s3. Each pair of value functions has one intersection.6 An individual of type a
chooses the schooling level which delivers the highest value. Speciﬁcally, consider an indi-
vidual choosing between si and sj, with i>jand i,j ∈{ 1,2,3}. The individual chooses
si over sj whenever the individual’s utility cost of schooling is low enough, that is whenever
a<a ij,τ where aij,τ is a threshold utility cost for which an individual with such utility cost
6The implication that there exist one intersection between each pair of value functions is a result of the
inﬁnite support for a and that s3 >s 2 >s 1. To see this, note that as long as Vτ(s) is ﬁnite there exists, for
each generation, an individual with a low enough a,d e n o t e db yaτ,s u c ht h a t
Vτ(s3) − aτs3 >V τ(s2) − aτs2 >V τ(s1) − aτs1.
Then, the linearity and slopes of Vτ(s)−as imply that each pair of functions intersect once for some a>a τ.
9of schooling is indiﬀerent between level i and j:7
Vτ(si) − aij,τsi = Vτ(sj) − aij,τsj.
The educational attainment rates of cohort τ,d e n o t e db ypiτ, are then
p1τ =1 − A(a21,τ), (6)
p2τ = A(a21,τ) − A(a32,τ), (7)
p3τ = A(a32,τ), (8)
as illustrated in Figure 5.8 It is possible to characterize the threshold utility costs as functions













Thus, the threshold utility costs are proportional to the semi-elasticity of lifetime income































Equation (9) shows that, in the model, changes in educational attainment are driven by
skill-biased technical change. Remember that skill-biased technical change takes place only
when the ziτ’s are growing at diﬀerent rates, implying that ziτ/zjτ is a function of time.
Not surprisingly, holding everything else constant, an increase in ziτ/zjτ raises schooling
enrollment in level i and reduces it in level j.
We note that the level of TFP, z, is absent in the determination of the critical agents
because the baseline model abstracts from any potential asymmetry between the changes in
7Since individuals are indexed by their utility cost of schooling we also refer to the threshold aij as the
critical agent.
8The inﬁnite support for a ensures that there is always a non-empty set of individuals choosing the ﬁrst
level of schooling and another non-empty set of individuals choosing the third level. It is possible, however,
that no individual ﬁnds it optimal to choose the second level. In such case, there is only one critical agent,
a31,τ,d e ﬁ n e db yVτ(s3) − a31,τs3 = Vτ(s1) − a31,τs1. We do not emphasize this case since it does not arise
in our main quantitative work.
10beneﬁts and costs of schooling. A change in z aﬀects the lifetime income of agents in the same
proportion, regardless of their education, as well as the opportunity cost of education. This
property of the model is common in the human capital literature, see for instance Bils and
Klenow (2000). We show in Section 4 that allowing for TFP-level eﬀects does not change
our main quantitative conclusions. Note also that the growth rate of TFP, g, appears in
Equation (9). So, while g aﬀects the level of educational attainment – a higher growth rate
of income increases the optimal amount of schooling – it does not aﬀect the evolution of
educational attainment over time in our baseline experiment since we keep this growth rate
constant. Finally, life expectancy, T, also appears in the determination of the critical agents.
Increases in T promote educational attainment. To understand this, suppose that there is
no skill-biased technical progress. Then, an increase in T raises the working life of the more
educated proportionately more than that of the less educated and, therefore, it also raises
their relative lifetime income. When there is skill-biased technical change this eﬀect is even
stronger. We keep T constant in our baseline experiment but we explore its quantitative
contribution to educational attainment in Section 4.
3 Quantitative Analysis
This section proceeds as follows. In Section 3.1 we discuss the calibration which consists of
two stages. First, some parameters are assigned numerical values using a-priori information.
Second, the remaining parameters are calibrated to match key statistics of the U.S. economy
for the year 2000, as well as overall growth in GDP per worker and relative earnings across
schooling groups during the period 1940 to 2000. Unlike the business cycle literature, where
the evolution of productivity is calibrated independently to Solow residuals, we do not have
independent measures of our main driving forces. These measures are derived in the second
stage of the calibration. It is important to emphasize that the actual evolution of educa-
tional attainment between 1940 and 2000 is not used for calibration. Thus, the quantitative
importance of the mechanisms built into the model can be assessed by their ability to gen-
erate trends in educational attainment as displayed in Figure 1. In Section 3.2, we use our
measures of technical change to assess their quantitative contribution in explaining the rise
in educational attainment in the U.S. economy. In Section 3.3 we propose a series of exper-
iments to decompose the role of each component of technical change. Finally, in Section 3.4
we consider alternative assumptions about what happens to skill-biased technical progress
after 2000.
113.1 Calibration
The ﬁrst stage of our calibration strategy is to assign values to some parameters using a-
priori information. We let a period represent one year and consider that agents are born at
age 6. The length of model life is set to T = 60, the gross interest rate to r =1 .05, and the
subjective discount factor to β =1 /r. The length of schooling, s1, s2,a n ds3, are set to the
average time spent in school at each educational category for the 25-29 year-old white males
in the 2000 U.S. Census. This restriction dictates s1 =9 ,s2 =1 3a n ds3 = 18.
The list of remaining parameters is
θ =( μ,σ,η,g,g2,g 3,z 2,2000,z 3,2000)
which consists of the distribution parameters for the utility cost of schooling, the human
capital technology, and growth rates and levels for productivity variables. We build a measure
of the distance between statistics in the model and the corresponding statistics in the U.S.
data. The procedure targets the following statistics: (i) the educational attainment of the
25-29 years old in the 2000 Census which are 13.4 percent less than high school and 58.8
percent high school;9 (ii) the share of time in the total cost of education in 2000 of 90 percent
– see for instance Bils and Klenow (2000); (iii) the time path of relative earnings from 1940
to 2000; and (iv) the growth rate of GDP per worker from 1940 to 2000 which was on average
2 percent. We then choose each element of θ simultaneously to minimize this function.
Even though parameter values are chosen simultaneously to match the data targets in
(i) to (iv), each parameter has a ﬁrst-order eﬀect on some target. For instance, the levels
of skill-biased technology, zi,2000, and their growth rates, gi are important in matching the
time path of relative earnings across schooling groups. The growth of TFP g is important in
matching growth in average labor productivity. The time share η is important for the share
of time in human capital accumulation.10 The utility cost of schooling parameters, μ and σ,
are crucial in matching the distribution of educational attainment in 2000.
The calibration procedure can be described formally as follows. Given a value for θ we




9The model counterpart to these statistics is educational attainment of the 1981 generation which is 20
years old in 2000 in the model and corresponds to age 25 in the U.S. data.
10It turns out that because the model abstracts from TFP-level eﬀects, the shares of time and goods in
the production of human capital are irrelevant for the quantitative properties of the baseline model. They
do aﬀect the earnings of a given schooling group across cohorts.
12is the period-t earnings of an agent of generation t−si and education level i, relative to that
of an agent of generation t − sj, with education level j. Observe that at date t both agents
are just entering the labor force. This calculation is justiﬁed by the importance of age in
earnings in the data. The empirical counterpart of ˆ E32,t(θ) is the relative earnings between
college and high school, denoted by E32,t. Similarly, ˆ E21,t(θ) is the model counterpart of


















where xt is the average share of time in the total cost of education.11 Then, to assign a value














where T≡ { 1940,1950,...,2000}.
The second column of Table 1 indicates the value of the calibrated parameters. The
model is able to match exactly the calibration targets in terms of the moments summarized
in M(θ). Also, the model implies a smooth path of relative earnings that captures the trend
observed in the data as illustrated in Figure 6.12
3.2 Baseline Experiment
The main quantitative implications of the model are with respect to the time path of educa-
tional attainment. In particular, the model implies time paths for the distribution of educa-
tional attainment for the three categories considered: less than high-school, high-school, and
college. Figure 7 reports these implications of the model. The model implies a substantial
increase in educational attainment – an increase in average years of schooling of 48 percent





i=1,2,3 pi,t(Li,t−si,tsi + et(si))
.
12Our speciﬁcation of skill bias has only two parameters per relative skill level, as a result, the best the
calibration can do is to ﬁt a trend line through the data points. As we will discuss below, skill bias produces a
substantial eﬀect on educational attainment so the exact parametrization matters for the quantitative results.
In Section 3.3 we discuss the results in light of diﬀerent assumptions regarding skill-biased technology.
13between 1940 and 2000 compared to 27 percent in the data.13 By construction of our cali-
bration strategy, the model implies an average years of schooling of 13.9 as in the data for
2000. In 1940, the model implies an average years of schooling of 9.4, whereas in the data
this average is 10.9 years. In terms of the distributions, the fraction of 25 to 29 year-old with
college education increases in the model by 28 percentage points from 1940 to 2000, while in
the data the increase is 20 percentage points. For high school, the model implies an increase
from 10 to 60 percent between 1940 and 2000 whereas, in the data, the increase is from 30
to 60 percent. The model implies a roughly constant share of expenditures in education over
GDP around 4 percent which is in the ball park of estimates in Haveman and Wolfe (1995).
We chose the year 2000 for most of our calibration targets. Given how diﬀerent the
educational attainments are in 1940, the question arises whether the results depend on this
choice. We investigate this issue by calibrating the economy to data for 1940 instead. The
calibrated parameters are presented in the last column of Table 1. Note that the parameters
are reasonably close in each calibration, except for μ and σ, which should not be a surprise.14
Given this alternative calibration, the quantitative results are fairly similar, for instance, the
increase in average years of schooling from 1940 to 2000 is around 50 percent, close to the
48 percent increase in the baseline model calibrated to data in 2000. One interesting aspect
of the results of the calibration to 1940 data is that, while the underlined quantitative force
of technological progress on educational attainment is the same, the results presented in this
way emphasize one aspect of the data that the baseline experiment is not able to capture
– namely the slowdown in educational attainment starting in the mid 1970’s (see Figures 1
and 8). We come back to this issue in Section 3.4 where we discuss alternative assumptions
about skill-biased technical change after the year 2000. We show that these alternative
assumptions can potentially rationalize the observed slowdown in educational attainment.
3.3 Decomposing the Forces
The motivation for our approach is to exploit the observed earnings heterogeneity in a parsi-
monious environment to isolate its contribution on the evolution of educational attainment.
In light of this, we decompose the importance of the exogenous forces leading to labor pro-
ductivity and earnings growth by running a sequence of counterfactual experiments. These
13We compute average years of schooling of the 25 to 29 year-old population implied by the model as  
i sipi in each year. We do the same for the data, i.e., we use the attainment data together with the
calibrated si’s.
14Table 1 reports the level of z2,1940 and z3,1940 which are the calibrated level parameters in this exercise.
The paths z2t and z3t are remarkably close, however, in the two exercises. For example, the implied value of
z2,2000 and z3,2000 in the 1940 calibration are 1.37 and 1.78, respectively.
14experiments are reported in Table 2.
The ﬁrst experiment is designed to assess the importance of the high school bias. We set
g2 = 1 and adjust g3 such that g3/g2 remains the same as in the baseline case. We maintain
the rest of the parameters at their baseline values. Measured by average years of schooling,
the change in educational attainment falls to 10 percent from 48 percent in the baseline.
Lower educational attainment growth leads to substantially lower labor productivity growth
(1.3 vs 2 percent in the baseline). The second experiment assesses the role of the college
bias. We assume that g3 = g2 with g2 at its baseline value. In this case the earnings of
college relative to high school does not change over time. The departure in this experiment
in terms of average educational attainment is much less than in the previous experiment,
average years of schooling increase by 31 percent instead of 48 percent in the baseline.
Also, the college bias does not contribute much to overall productivity growth. In the third
experiment, we shut down skill bias completely by imposing g2 = g1 = 1. As discussed
previously, the model without skill-biased technical change does not generate any change in
educational attainment and relative earnings. As a consequence, labor productivity growth
is slightly above the value of g. Given the results from these experiments, we conclude that,
in terms of skill-biased technical change, the high-school bias is the most important force
behind the changes in educational attainment. More precisely, shutting down the high-school
bias implies the largest departure from the baseline at the aggregate level (average years of
schooling and the growth rate of the economy).
We emphasize that the educational attainment implications of the model are sensitive to
the calibration of skill-biased technical change. The baseline calibration captures the overall
trend in relative earnings over the 1940 to 2000 period. However, this trend is calculated only
over 7 Census years and there is substantial decade-to-decade variation in relative earnings.
We illustrate the quantitative importance of the trends in relative earnings by conducting a
fourth experiment were we reduce by half the growth rate of relative earnings between 1940
and 2000. We accomplish this by adjusting the growth rates g2 and g3 so that the growth
in relative technical progress of the two groups is reduced by half relative to the baseline
calibration. We leave all other parameters the same. In this experiment, average years of
schooling between 1940 to 2000 increase by 24 percent (27 percent in the data), while average
growth in GDP per worker is 1.84 percent (2 percent in the data).
153.4 Alternative Paths for Relative Earnings
The baseline experiment provides a parsimonious representation of the increase in relative
returns across schooling groups and its impact on educational attainment. More speciﬁ-
cally, the baseline experiment assumes a constant growth rate in skill-biased technology that
continues into the future. However, relative earnings since the 1990s show considerable slow-
down. Given that schooling decisions are forward looking we can ask whether a slowdown in
skill-biased technology can potentially explain the observed slowdown in educational attain-
ment. We make the extreme assumption that there is no skill bias after the year 2000, i.e., we
set g2 = g3 = 1 from 2000 onwards, leaving all other aspects of the baseline experiment the
same. We ﬁnd that the implied time path for educational attainment features considerably
slowdown relative to the baseline calibration, see Figure 9. Intuitively, the model without
skill-biased technology and constant TFP growth implies a constant path for educational
attainment. As a result, the educational decisions of the cohorts that dominate the measure
of educational attainment in the last part of the time series are highly inﬂuenced by the
constant proﬁle of relative earnings starting in 2000. Under this calibration, average years
of schooling increase by 39 percent vis ` a vis 48 percent in the baseline.
4E x t e n s i o n s
In this section we consider three extensions of the model mechanisms that can potentially
aﬀect the importance of relative earnings on educational attainment. First, we study a
simulation of the model that allows for life-expectancy to change according to data. Since
there has been a substantial change in life expectancy for the relevant cohorts in the sam-
ple period we ask whether this can provide an important source of changes in educational
attainment. Second, we incorporate on-the-job human capital accumulation into the model.
Human capital accumulated on the job aﬀects lifetime income and therefore can aﬀect educa-
tional attainment. Finally, in the spirit of Ben-Porath (1967), Manuelli and Seshadri (2006)
and Erosa, Koreshkova, and Restuccia (2007), we extend the model to allow for TFP-level
changes to aﬀect schooling decisions. In all these extensions, we ﬁnd that the importance of
changes in relative earnings in generating a substantial increase in educational attainment
remains unaltered.
164.1 Life Expectancy
There has been a substantial increase in life-expectancy in the United States. For males,
life expectancy at age 5 increased from around 50 years in 1850 to around 70 years in 2000.
Because the return to schooling investment accrues with the working life, this increase can
generate an incentive for higher amounts of schooling investment. However, human capital
theory also indicates that the returns to human capital investment are higher early in the
life cycle rather than later (see for instance Ben-Porath (1967)) and as a result, increases
in life expectancy may command a low return given that they extend the latest part of the
life cycle of individuals. Whereas the increase in life expectancy is substantial, this life cycle
aspect of the increase in life expectancy may dampen the overall contribution of this factor
in promoting human capital investment. In this section we ask whether the increase in life
expectancy is quantitatively important in explaining the increase in educational attainment
and whether it dampens the contribution of relative earnings in our baseline model.
We proceed by simulating the model using the changes in life expectancy as observed
in the data.15 We recalibrate the economy in 2000 to the same targets but taking into
account the changes in life expectancy. The main changes in the calibration relative to the
baseline involve parameters pertaining to the distribution of utility cost of schooling and
the growth rates of technology. Overall, we ﬁnd that the increase in life-expectancy does
not change the implications of the model substantially, in fact, life-expectancy has only
modest eﬀects in educational attainment during this period. We make this assessment by
comparing the implications on educational attainment of the model calibrated to the changes
in life expectancy with the model keeping life expectancy constant at its 2000 level. The
model with changes in life expectancy generates an increase of 50 percent in average years
of schooling. Holding life expectancy constant reduces this increase to 48 percent as in the
baseline model. Hence, the change in life expectancy during this period explains 4 percent
of the increase in educational attainment (2 percentage points out of 50). We conclude that
while changes in life expectancy are substantial during this period, their eﬀect on educational
attainment are not quantitatively important.
4.2 On-the-job Human Capital Accumulation
The baseline model abstracts from human capital accumulated on the job. The data suggest
that there are considerable returns to experience. The age proﬁle of earnings, for example,
15Speciﬁcally, the life expectancy of the period-t generation is Tt = gTTt−1 given an initial condition T1850.
The pair (T1850,g T) is chosen as to minimize the distance between the U.S. data and [Tt], in a least square
sense. (The notation [·] denotes the nearest integer function.)
17are increasing in the data while our baseline model implies that they are decreasing. Returns
to experience may aﬀect educational decisions. First, if they increase with education – as
we will show it is the case in the data – then this provides an additional return to school-
ing, reinforcing the eﬀects of skill-biased technical change. Second, substantial returns to
experience implies that, other things equal, individuals would have an incentive to enter the
labor market sooner. Because of these opposing eﬀects, it is a quantitative question whether
on-the-job human capital accumulation aﬀects the evolution of educational attainment over
time.





where x = a − s measures years of experience and γ(s) is the human capital elasticity of
experience for a worker who has completed s years of schooling. Note that we allow this
elasticity to diﬀer across schooling groups. This feature is motivated by the age proﬁle of
earnings observed in the year 2000 and displayed in Figure 10. The ratios of weekly earnings
between a 55- and a 25-year old are 1.6, 1.9, and 2.1 for less than high school, high school,
and college.
In our ﬁrst pass at assessing the importance of returns to experience, we use the infor-
mation presented in Figure 10 to calibrate this version of the model. That is, in addition
to the baseline targets, we choose the three γ(si)’s to match the age proﬁle of earnings in
2000.16 In terms of educational attainment, the calibrated model with on-the-job human
capital accumulation reduces the incentives to remain in school created by skill-biased tech-
nical progress. The average number of years of schooling increases from 10.9 in 1940 to 13.9
in 2000 – an increase of 27 percent which compares to 27 percent in the U.S. data and 48
percent in the baseline model. The calibrated returns to experience in this extension of the
model dampen the incentives for schooling investment.
We note, however, that there is strong evidence that the returns to experience have been
falling for recent cohorts in the U.S. data – see Manovskii and Kambourov (2005). To try
and capture the eﬀect of this decrease in returns to experience, we compare the life-proﬁle
of earnings of a 25 year old in 1940 versus a 25 year old in 1970 – see Table 3. A 25-year-old
in 1940 can expect weekly earnings to increase by a factor of at least 2.74 when reaching
55 years of age. In sharp contrast, a 25-year-old in 1970 should not expect earnings to
16The calibrated parameters g, g2,a n dg3 are 1.011, 1.005, and 1.010. We ﬁnd γ(s1)=0 .36, γ(s2)=0 .39
and γ(s3)=0 .28 for the human capital elasticity of experience. The calibrated model with on-the-job human
capital accumulation matches the age proﬁle of earnings in 2000 by construction.
18increase by a factor of more than 2.15 when reaching 55. This “ﬂattening” of the age proﬁle
of earnings does not aﬀect equally all educational groups. In fact, the increase in earnings
throughout the life cycle is enhanced more by education for the 1970 cohort than for the 1940
cohort: A 25-year old in 1940 would see weekly earnings increase 12 percent faster choosing
high school versus less than high school. In 1970, the same individual would see earnings
increase 28 percent faster by choosing high school. The same result holds, qualitatively, for
college versus high school. Using these numbers and assuming an annual interest rate of
5 percent, we can build a back-of-the-envelope ratio of lifetime income across educational
groups and generations. Consider, for example, the earnings of a 25-year old in 1940 with
less than high school and normalize this to one. At age 55, earnings are 2.74, implying a
present value of 24.9. For a member of the same cohort but in the high school schooling
group, the present value of earnings is 26.3. Thus, high school increases the present value of
earnings by 6 percent (26.3/24.9−1) for a member of this generation. For a member of the
1970 generation the same calculation indicates that high school increases the present value
of earnings by 10 percent. Similarly, college increased lifetime income by 7 percent for the
1940 generation versus 16 percent for the 1970 generation.
We conclude that the ﬂattening of the life proﬁles of earnings across generations is con-
ducive to attracting recent generations into more schooling. We use the model to compute
educational attainment for the 1940 and 1970 cohorts. Adjusting the γ(si) ’ st oa l l o wf o r
the ﬂattening of the life proﬁles of earnings, we ﬁnd that the implied increase in educational
attainment is close to the baseline experiment that abstracts from returns to experience (48
percent). Hence, changes in relative earnings generate a substantial increase in educational
attainment and this eﬀect is robust to the incorporation of reasonable returns to experience
in the data.
4.3 TFP-Level Eﬀects
The baseline model abstracts from TFP-level eﬀects. Since there is a literature that em-
phasizes TFP-level eﬀects in explaining schooling diﬀerences across countries, we extend the
model to allow for these eﬀects and assess whether they matter for our main conclusion that
changes in relative earnings represent a substantial force in explaining the increase in edu-
cational attainment in the United States from 1940 to 2000. We follow Ben-Porath (1967)
in allowing for TFP-level eﬀects by extending our production function for human capital
to include stages in human capital accumulation, where the human capital from previous
schooling levels enter as an input in the production of human capital of the next level. In





where i ∈{ 1,2,3} denotes the schooling stage and h0 = 1. The lifetime net income of an
agent of generation τ is then
Iτ(si) = max
e1,e2,e3≥0
{hiWτ(si) − e1 − e2 − e3}.
In this formulation, the eﬃciency units of labor of an agent are used either for producing
goods in the market or for producing next stage human capital in school. This diﬀers from
the previous formulation where eﬃciency units of labor where used only in producing goods.
The agent decides how much to spend at each level of schooling ei. An implication of this
extension is that a unit of spending in high school quality increases the marginal productivity
of spending in college. Thus, when the level of income rises because of TFP, a one percent
increase in education quality aﬀects income proportionately more at the highest level of
education. Formally, we can show that dlnI(si)/dlnz = η−i while in the baseline model
this elasticity is 1/η at each schooling level i.
We calibrate this version of the model exactly as described in Section 3.1. We ﬁnd
that the increase in average years of schooling in the model is 48 percent, just as in the
baseline model that abstracts from TFP-level eﬀects. We then use this calibrated version of
the model to compute the evolution of educational attainment predicted when skill-biased
technical change is set to zero, that is when g2 = g3 =1 .0. Thus, TFP alone drives the
results of this experiment. We ﬁnd that average years of schooling increase by 5 percent
and conclude that 10 percent (5/48) of the rise in average years of schooling is due to the
increase in the TFP level. The remaining 90 percent is due to skill-biased technical change
in the model.
5 Discussion
In this section we ﬁrst evaluate the robustness of our main quantitative results to relevant
variations in functional-form speciﬁcations. Namely, we introduce imperfect substitution
across schooling groups in the output technology and we consider alternative distributions for
the marginal utility of schooling. We ﬁnd that the importance of changes in relative earnings
in explaining the increase in educational attainment is remarkably robust to these variations.
We end with a discussion of the implied income elasticity of educational attainment in the
20model and relate it to the existing literature.
5.1 Substitution across Schooling Groups
We emphasize that the technology for aggregate human capital allows perfect substitution
between skill groups. This assumption is less problematic than it may ﬁrst appear. The
reason is that our results do not emphasize a particular quantitative elasticity of skill-biased
technical change to educational attainment. Neither do they emphasize a tight measurement
of skill-biased technical parameters. Clearly those applications would necessitate tight mea-
surements for the elasticities in the technology for aggregate human capital as well as other
sources of labor productivity growth. Instead our emphasis is on the role of skill-biased tech-
nical change – as measured by the change in relative earnings – on educational attainment
without explicit decomposition of the quantitative source. For instance, an alternative sub-
stitution elasticity in aggregate human capital would require a diﬀerent quantitative source
of skill-biased technology to match the same relative earnings paths. The discipline imposed
on the quantitative results of the paper hinge on the relative earnings paths.
The following exercise illustrates this point. Consider, a general constant-elasticity-of-
substitution technology for aggregate human capital:





where ρ<1. Output is Yt = ztHt. This speciﬁcation implies an elasticity of substitution
of 1/(1 − ρ) between skill groups. For values of ρ strictly below one diﬀerent skill groups
are more complementary than in the baseline speciﬁcation, and an increase in any given zit
aﬀects the wage rate of all skill groups.
For simplicity, we consider a steady-state situation in levels, that is a situation where zt
and the zit’s are constant through time.17 An equilibrium is a set of prices, w(si), and an








Hi =( T − si)h(si,e(si)),
for i ∈{ 1,2,3}, and individuals solve problem (2) given prices. The ﬁrst condition above
equates the marginal product of human capital for skill group i to its wage rate. The second
17Our model does not have a balanced growth path.
21equation is the labor market clearing condition for skill group i.
The nature of the exercise is similar to that of Section 3.1. We set s1, s2, s3, T, r and
β to their values in Table 1, and we ﬁx z1 to one. Then we proceed in two steps. First, we
calibrate the steady state of the model to match the U.S. economy in 2000. Speciﬁcally, we
have two targets for educational attainment rates, two for relative earnings and one for the
share of time in the total cost of education. We impose z = 1 and we pick ﬁve parameters
to match these targets: (μ,σ,η,z2,z 3). In a second step, we re-calibrate z, z2 and z3.W e
choose them to match three targets: the relative earnings in 1940 and the ratio of GDP per
capita between 1940 and 2000. Hence, as in the baseline calibration, this exercise uses the
evolution of relative earnings to measure skill-speciﬁc technical change. We then ask by how
much educational attainment is changing. We repeat this exercise for diﬀerent values of ρ.
This procedure delivers the equivalent of the baseline experiment described earlier. We also
reproduce experiments 1 and 2 of section 3.3 in order to isolate the contribution of high
school and college bias.
Table 4 reports the results. For selected values for ρ, the table shows educational attain-
ment in 1940 and relative earnings in 2000 and 1940, for the baseline exercise and experiments
1 and 2. First, we note that there are diﬀerences between the steady-state version of the
model with ρ = 1 and the dynamic version presented earlier. The steady-state version of
the model implies a lower increase in educational attainment because of the absence of ex-
ogenous growth in earnings throughout the lifetime of individuals. Second, by comparing
across steady-state economies with diﬀerent values for ρ, Table 4 shows that the elasticity
of substitution does not aﬀect the main conclusions. Once skill-biased technical parameters
are calibrated to match the evolution of relative earnings, changes in educational attainment
across diﬀerent calibrations for ρ are almost identical. This is true for the baseline exercise
and the counterfactuals. In addition, it is interesting to note that the calibrated parameters
for the human capital technology and the distribution of utility cost of schooling are hardly
changing across these calibrations. Thus, the main eﬀect of ρ is to impose diﬀerent values
for the skill-biased technical parameters in levels and rates of change.
We recognize that these results only apply to a steady-state version of the model. How-
ever, we expect that the same quantitative eﬀects will carry through in the dynamic version
of the model with diﬀerent elasticities of substitution across skill groups. Data limitations
prevent us from carrying through these experiments. When ρ<1, the dynamic version of
the model requires much more data than presently available. The reason for this is that
in the model with ρ<1, the wage rate at a point in time depends on the educational at-
tainment of all cohorts working. Thus, this will require data on relative earnings going as
22far back as 1900 or before. And wages are necessary to solve for human capital and earn-
ings in 1940. When ρ = 1, wages are only a function of technical parameters at each date.
Assuming perfect substitution across skill groups in the human capital technology not only
allows us to assess the role of technical change in educational attainment in a simple and
tractable framework, but also gives us a reasonable characterization since the quantitative
implications of the model turn out to be insensitive to alternative substitution elasticities
after the model is calibrated to match the same relative earnings targets.
5.2 Distribution of Marginal Utility of Schooling
The model assumes a normal distribution to represent heterogeneity in preferences. Are the
results robust to this choice? Intuitively, alternative distributional assumptions may deliver
diﬀerent implications for the evolution of educational attainment. In fact, changes in edu-
cational attainment depend on the distribution of the marginal cost of schooling time, as
can be seen from Equations (6) to (8). To address this issue, we consider a more general
distribution function: the Beta distribution. This distribution is deﬁned on the unit interval
and characterized by two parameters, μ and σ. Depending on the parameters, its density
can be uniform, bell-shaped or u-shaped and it is not necessarily symmetric. Our question is
whether the calibration described in Section 3.1 imposes enough discipline on the distribu-
tion of schooling utility so as to identify the elasticity of educational attainment to relative
earnings.
We selected the Beta distribution because it has two parameters and, therefore, we can
keep our calibration strategy while allowing the distribution of schooling utility to be po-
tentially diﬀerent from a normal. To make comparisons with the baseline case, where a can











where a is distributed according to a Beta distribution with parameters μ and σ,a n dM is
a positive number. The role of M is to map the domain of a into the interval [−M/2,M/2],
therefore allowing an arbitrarily large range for the marginal utility of schooling time.
We calibrate the model and compute the path of educational attainment with a Beta
distribution for a range of M values. We compare the results to the baseline by computing













We also compute the mean and standard deviation of the marginal utility of schooling. In
the baseline case they are, as indicated in Table 1, μ =2 .16 and σ =0 .62, respectively.
When M = 50 we ﬁnd   =7 .13×10−2 and the mean and standard deviation of the marginal
utility of schooling are 2.10 and 0.63. When M = 100, we ﬁnd   =1 .95 × 10−6. Finally,
for M = 500 we ﬁnd   =7 .35 × 10−8 and the mean and standard deviation of the marginal
utility of schooling are essentially the same as in the baseline case.
We emphasize that, in these exercises, the calibration strategy is the same as the one
described in Section 3.1 – only the 2000 educational attainment data are used to identify
the distribution of schooling utility. Our results indicate that the calibrated parametrization
of the Beta distribution is quite close to the Normal used in the baseline and, consequently,
the paths of educational attainment are nearly identical. Hence, our results are robust to
potential departures from a normal distribution for schooling utility. We conclude that the
calibration of the distribution of schooling utility to educational attainment at a point in time
imposes enough discipline to pin down the elasticity of educational attainment to relative
earnings.
5.3 The Elasticity of Educational Attainment
The model delivers an elasticity of educational attainment to changes in relative earnings
(technical progress and lifetime income). In the previous section we argued that the main
discipline of that elasticity comes from the calibration to the distribution of educational
attainment at a point in time. Next we would like to discuss the magnitude of the implied
elasticity.
There is a large empirical literature assessing the impact of educational policy on school-
ing. Some studies focus on ﬁnding the response of college attainment to changes in subsidies
(short-run elasticities) while other focus on factors that alter lifetime behavior (long-run elas-
ticities). Examples of this literature include Dynarski (2002, 2003), van der Klaauw (2002),
and Keane and Wolpin (1997). While there is no complete agreement on the exact magni-
tude of these elasticities, the evidence suggests that they are large and we use this evidence
to provide a benchmark against which to assess the magnitude implied by our quantitative
results. For instance, Keane and Wolpin (1997) estimate a life-cycle model of schooling and
career choices. Their structural estimates imply that subsidizing college costs by about 50
24percent increases college completion from 28.3 to 36.7 percent. To construct an elasticity,
we assume that the subsidy represents between 0.5 to 2 percent of lifetime income. This
implies an elasticity of college completion between 52 and 13. To summarize the elasticity of
educational attainment across cohorts in our model, note that the relative lifetime income
of a college educated agent increases approximately by a factor (g3/g2)60 =1 .32 between the
1921 and the 1981 generation, while their respective educational attainment increases from
2 . 5t o2 7 . 8p e r c e n t . 18 This yields an elasticity in the model of 8.7.
Studies that focus on short-term elasticities estimate even larger elasticities than the
one in Keane and Wolpin (1997). Dynarski (2003) studies an exogenous change in education
policy – namely the elimination of the Social Security Student Beneﬁt program in the United
States in 1981 – that aﬀected some students but not others. Dynarski found that $1000 ($ of
2000) in college subsidy generates an increase in college enrollment of 3.6 percentage points.
This can be translated into an elasticity if we assume that the amount of subsidy is the
equivalent of 0.2 percent of lifetime income, implying an elasticity of college enrollment of
61. The elasticity of college completion would be around 31.19 Alternatively, we can try to
represent the ﬁnding in Dynarski doing the same policy experiment in our model. To get an
increase in college enrollment of 3.6 percentage points for the 1981 generation in the model,
a subsidy to college that is close to 2 percent of lifetime income is needed. We think this is a
much larger number than $1000 in college subsidies. We conclude that the large increase in
educational attainment in the baseline model comes from strong changes in relative earnings
and not from an implausibly large elasticity of educational attainment to changes in income.
5.4 Further Implications
Our theory emphasizes relative earnings through skill-biased technical change as an impor-
tant source of movements in educational attainment over time. In Figure 2 we emphasized
that the evolution of educational attainment was similar for men and women. For our model
to be consistent with these trends, changes in relative earnings would have to be about the
same magnitude for men and women. Using data from the U.S. Census we decompose rela-
tive earnings across schooling groups for men and women. We ﬁnd that the trend behavior
of relative earnings across schooling groups are remarkably similar between men and women
– see Figure 11. This process would imply a similar evolution of educational attainment
18We focus on the 1921–1981 generations because, in the model, we assume that agents are born at age 6.
A 25-year old in 1940 was 6 years old in 1921. Similarly, a 25-year old in 2000 was 6 years old in 1981.
19Similar elasticities are found by other empirical studies with diﬀerent experiments, see for instance
Dynarski (2002) and van der Klaauw (2002). Perhaps the larger elasticity implied by these studies is related
to credit constraints that aﬀect college enrollment.
25across genders in the model, which is consistent with the data. Whereas the data for relative
earnings indicates similar skill-biased technical change for men and women – with compara-
ble evolution of education across genders – there is also a substantial and declining gender
wage gap during this period. Hence, it appears that the gender wage gap has not played a
major role for schooling investments across genders.
6 Conclusion
We developed a model of schooling decisions to address the role of changes in relative earn-
ings through technological progress on the rise of educational attainment in the United States
between 1940 and 2000. The model features discrete schooling choices and individual het-
erogeneity so that people sort themselves into the diﬀerent schooling groups. Technological
progress takes two forms: neutral and skill biased. Skill-biased technical change increases
the returns of schooling thereby creating an incentive for more people to attain higher levels
of schooling. We ﬁnd that this source of technological progress is quantitatively important
in explaining the increase in educational attainment in the United States between 1940 and
2000. More speciﬁcally, we found that the high-school bias is quantitatively more important
for the educational trends than the college bias. The substantial changes in life expectancy
turns out to explain almost none of the change in educational attainment in our model.
We have focused on the long-run trend of educational attainment in the United States.
Two issues would be worth exploring further. First, while the model with skill-biased tech-
nical change can generate the overall trend in educational attainment, the model would need
a ﬂattening of the skill-biased proﬁle somewhere after the 90s or before in order to be con-
sistent with the slowdown in educational attainment since the late 70s. Second, it would be
interesting to assess the role of skill-biased technical change in other contexts such as across
genders, races, and countries. In particular, it would be relevant to investigate changes in
relative earnings in countries with diﬀerent labor-market institutions. Institutions that com-
press wages may reduce the incentives for schooling investment and it would be interesting to
see (holding other institutional aspects constant) whether this wage compression can explain
the lower educational attainment in European and other countries compared to the United
States. Our analysis has taken the direction of technical change as given. It would be inter-
esting to study quantitatively human capital accumulation allowing for endogenous technical
change in the spirit of Galor and Moav (2000). We leave all these relevant explorations for
future research.
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29AD a t a
The main source of data is the U.S. Census (1 percent samples from IPUMS, 1940-2000). The
income variable is incwage, which reports the respondent’s total pre-tax wage and salary
income. This variable is available at each census date from 1940 to 2000, and is intended to
capture all monetary compensations received for work as an employee. Earnings are divided
by the number of weeks worked. This is computed from wkswork2, which reports the
number of weeks worked, by intervals. (We use the mid-point of the interval). This variable
is available at each Census from 1940 to 2000. A variable reporting the exact number of
weeks worked exists at some, but not all, Census dates. The education variable is educrec
which indicates the highest grade or year of college completed. The categories for educrec
are: 1 for N/A or No schooling; 2 for Grades 1 through 4; 3 for Grades 5 through 8; 4 for
Grade 9; 5 for Grade 10; 6 for Grade 11; 7 for Grade 12; 8 for 1, 2, or 3 years of college; and
8 for 4 years of college or more. For each educational level, we focus on a diﬀerent age group,
in order to compare the earnings of agents with similar levels of experience. Furthermore,
since our baseline model is about the returns to schooling and not experience, we focus on
the youngest age groups. More speciﬁcally, the Less-than-high-school group is represented
by 15-to-21-year-old reporting educrec between 1 and 6, the High-school-or-more group
is represented by 18-to-24-year-old reporting 7 or 8. Finally, the College group corresponds
to by 21-to-27-year-old reporting 9. We restrict our analysis to white (raced)m a l e s( sex)
working (empstat) for a wage or salary in the private or public sector (classwkr). For
each group, the bottom and top one percent of the distribution is ignored.
The source of data for Figures 1 and 2 is the Current Population Survey. The “Less-than-
high-school” category corresponds to the percentage of the 25-29 year-old population who has
completed less than four years of high school. The “High-school-or-some-college” category is
the percentage of the 25-29 year-old population who has completed four years of high school
or more, but less than four years of college. Finally, the “College” category corresponds to
those who have completed four years of college or more. There are no diﬀerences between
the educational attainment numbers displayed in Figures 1 and 2 and the numbers from the
U.S. Census.
To calibrate s1, s2 and s3, we use the variable educrec from the U.S. Census, as de-
scribed above. We compute the average years of schooling at each of the three levels in
2000.
30Table 1: Calibrated Parameters
Interpretation
Parameters Parameters
2000 Calibration 1940 Calibration
Length of schooling s1 =9 ,s2 = 13, s3 =1 8
Length of life T =6 0
Subjective discount factor β =0 .95
Interest rate r =1 /β =1 .05
Human capital technology η =0 .88 η =0 .89
Distribution of abilities μ =2 .16, σ =0 .62 μ =1 .45, σ =0 .69
Growth rates
Neutral technology g =1 .0104 g =1 .0070
HS biased technology g2 =1 .0045 g2 =1 .0046
College biased technology g3 =1 .0092 g3 =1 .0094
Level conditions
HS biased technology z2,2000 =1 .37 z2,1940 =1 .05
College biased technology z3,2000 =1 .78 z3,1940 =1 .02
Table 2: Decomposing the Role of Skill-Biased Technology and TFP
Baseline Exp. 1 Exp. 2 Exp. 3 Exp. 4
Years of Schooling
2000 13.85 13.16 13.14 12.55 13.16
1940 9.38 12.01 10.03 12.55 10.61
Ratio 1.48 1.10 1.31 1.00 1.24
Ratio of Relative
Earnings 2000/1940
College/HS (*) 1.38 1.38 1.00 1.00 1.17
HS/Less HS (**) 1.36 1.00 1.36 1.00 1.16
Average Growth (%)
GDP per Worker 2.00 1.26 1.96 1.18 1.84
Note – Exp. 1: No High-School bias i.e., g2 =1 .0a n dg3 is adjusted such that g3/g2 remains as in the
baseline case. Exp. 2: No College bias i.e., g3 = g2 =1 .0045. Exp. 3: No technical bias e.g., g2 = g3 =1 .0.
Exp. 4: Half the High-School bias i.e., the growth rate of z2 is divided by two and g3 adjusted. (*) the ratio
is ˆ E32,2000(θ)/ ˆ E32,1940(θ); (**) the ratio is ˆ E21,2000(θ)/ ˆ E21,1940(θ).
31Table 3: Ratio of Earnings Age 55 to Age 25
Less than
high school High school College
25 in 1940 2.74 3.08 3.53
=2 .74 × 1.12 = 3.08 × 1.14
 I2/I1 =1 .06 I3/I2 =1 .07
25 in 1970 1.18 1.51 2.15
=1 .18 × 1.28 = 1.51 × 1.43
 I2/I1 =1 .10 I3/I2 =1 .16
Note – The ﬁgures are the ratio of real weekly earnings of a person at age 55 versus age 25, by educational
groups and generations. Ii is the present value of earnings from age 25 to 55, by educational groups and
generations, when earnings are normalized to one at 25 and the interest rate is 5 percent per year. See the
appendix for the source of data and deﬁnitions.
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e Baseline 0.1459 0.0058 2.0 1.8 1.635
1.5 1.3 0.669
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33Figure 1: The Evolution of Educational Attainment for White Males, 25-29
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Note – See the appendix for the source of data and deﬁnitions.
Figure 2: The Evolution of Educational Attainment
- White - - Black -
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Note – See the appendix for the source of data and deﬁnitions. Women are represented with markers and
men with solid lines.
34Figure 3: Ratio of Weekly Earnings for Educational Groups – White Males

















































































Note – See the appendix for the source of data and deﬁnitions.
Figure 4: Individual Decision Problem
a21 a32
V (s3) − as3
V (s2) − as2
V (s1) − as1
a a
35Figure 5: The Distribution of Schooling Attainment
a21 a32




Figure 6: Relative Weekly Earnings – Model vs. Data



























































Note – The model data are represented with markers. The U.S. data are represented by solid lines.
36Figure 7: Educational Attainment – Model vs. Data



































































Note – The model data are represented with markers. The U.S. data are represented by solid lines.
Figure 8: Average Years of Schooling – Model Calibrated 1940 vs. Data



















37Figure 9: Educational Attainment – Model with Constant Relative Earnings after 2000 vs.
Baseline
























































Note – The baseline calibration is represented with solid lines. The calibration with constant relative earnings
after 2000 is represented with markers.
Figure 10: Age Proﬁle of Earnings in 2000































Note – See the appendix for the source of data and deﬁnitions. For each educational group the data point
at age a is the average weekly earnings of the (a − 5) − (a + 5) age group.
38Figure 11: Ratio of Weekly Earnings for Educational Groups – White Women











































































Note – The source of data is the U.S. Census. We use the exact same approach as the one described in
Appendix A to build the series of relative earnings.
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